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Are Two Dimensions Too Many? A One-dimensional
Rival to Two-dimensional Semantics
Abstract. We discuss two interpretations of two-dimensional semantics (2DMS)
of modality due to D. Chalmers and R. Stalnaker. The main problem with both
interpretations of the formal framework is the relinquishing of rigidity for terms.
They are in this sense unfaithful to an agent's beliefs. We present alternative prin-
ciples to capture what we take to be agents beliefs. These are the principles of
hyper-rigidity and backward reference to actuality. We propose, then, to go back to
a one-dimensional semantics which aords a satisfactory model of beliefs reports.
Our proposal, like 2DMS, addresses typical problems of representation for beliefs
and epistemological diÆculties related to modal knowledge.
Introduction
There are two basic stories concerning how the reference of proper
names is xed through possible worlds. The Hintikkean account as-
sociates names with individual concepts: each speaker associate with
names some modes of identication that determine reference in belief
worlds. Thus, "Cicero", as used by a speaker with a poor knowledge
of ancient Rome, does not rigidly refer to Cicero, but, for example,
to whomever she might take to be the most famous orator of the last
years of the Republic. The Kripkean account has it that individuals,
rigidly designated by the names we use for them, are the basic building
blocks of possible worlds: there is in fact no problem as to how the
reference of "Cicero" is xed, because it is precisely used to refer to
Cicero, whatever his occupation in Rome around 50 B.C., including or
not being a famous orator.
At rst sight, these two accounts seem incompatible. But one can
make them compatible if one takes them to deal with two dierent
kinds of possibility, namely, for the rst one, epistemic possibility, and,
for the second one, metaphysical possibility. The idea is thus that two
coreferential terms can fail to corefer, rigidity notwithstanding, in a
belief world, just in case the agent is mistaken as to the reference of
these terms and does not know they do corefer. Starting with this
idea, proponents of two dimensional modal semantics (2DMS for short)
suggest to merge the two accounts into one and the same theory. In
2DMS, a sentence can be associated with two kinds of intensions, the
rst one along Kripkean possible worlds, which will account for the fact
c
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2that the sentence expresses a necessary or contingent propostition, and
the second one along Hintikkean possible worlds, which will account
for failure of substitutivity in intensional contexts and for epistemic
properties of sentences.
1
Two-dimensional modal semantics is therefore an attractive frame-
work: it makes it possible to give a possible world analysis of content
compatible with Kripke's analysis of rigidity. But this synthesis rests
on an equivocation. The mere gluing of the two approaches does not
account for the speaker's intuition as described by Kripke. If rigid des-
ignation, and individuals picked through it, is all what possible worlds
are about, and if the content of the sentence expressed by a speaker
is to be a set of possible worlds, these possible worlds should be built
on the very basis supplied by rigid designation, since it is the only
basis on which we have an intuitive access to possible worlds. If I can
consistently believe that Hesperus and Phosphorus are not the same
thing, it should be just because I can consistently of Hesperus and of
Phosporus that they are not the same thing. Unfortunately, this is not
allowed in the 2DMS framework, since it represents the possibility that
they are not the same by resorting to a world in which Hesperus or
Phosphorus or both do not refer to what they actually refer to. But
as far as it is possible for me to have de re beliefs about Hespherus
and Phosporus, any account relying on this kind of trick misrepresents
what happens when I entertain the possibility that they are dierent,
since it represents it by two other objects which are in fact dierent,
while Hesperus and Phosphorus on which the agent's thought bears
are actually identical. Our aim is thus to represent on the contrary this
possibility that I might entertain as the possibility that Hesperus and
Phosphorus { the two objects in the sky that I can rigidly refer to {
are dierent, even if this possibility is not a metaphysical possibility (if
one grants that identity is necessary).
2DMS was precisely conceived as a theory whose ideal was to rec-
oncile rst-person intuitions about meaning and content and "oÆcial"
semantic content. Sometimes the two coincide, but in most interesting
cases there is a conict between intuitions and actual content. It is
solved by 2-dimensionalist in terms of theoretically prescribed Kripkean
content on one side, and Fregean content, on the other side, the latter
meant to reect the agent's intuitions about meaning. However, the
agent may resist this explanation and be convinced of her mentally
having a rm grip on a Kripkean content. One basic critical point is
that 2DMS is in some important respect cognitively inadequate because
it too soon departs from possible Kripkean intuitions the agent may
want to preserve in contexts in which 2DMS intends to make sense of
the agent's beliefs by reinstating Fregean semantics.
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is that in one major area of applications of 2DMS we have nothing but
intuitions, namely modal ones, to account for. The agent has some intu-
ition about what could be the case. She may have some further specic
intuition about the way she uses the terms that shape up her modal
intuition. But in fact our only access to the agent's modal intuition is
through the way she thinks she uses her terms and her report that she
used it rigidly or descriptively. In contexts of that sort, in order to make
correct predictions about what modal judgements are expressed, it is
crucial that our theory ts these semantic intuitions. Unlike 2DMS we
claim that in most cases modal intuitions are supported by Kripkean
intuitions concerning the semantics of the relevant terms, which means
that their use is intended to be rigid. Fregean contents were reinstated
by 2DMS theoreticians in order to make sense of seemingly contradic-
tory or irrational modal beliefs like the ones which imply a violation of
the identity of referred to individuals.
We defend an alternative way to connect modality and rationality by
keeping all along one single kind of semantic content and subsequently
by defusing the systematic transition between intuition and possibility
Fregean contents were supposed to allow back in the hands of 2DMSists.
This needs not be taken as an empirical point about the nature of modal
intuitions but as an important conceptual possibility that may make
empirical and intuitive sense. To put it bluntly: If I believe that water
could have a chemical structure dierent from H2O, what I may simply
mean is that I believe of H2O that it could be something dierent from
H2O. I may well believe an impossibility about H2O and water rather
than a possibility about something I did not obviously intended to refer
to. We prefer a theory which predicts this kind of semantic lucidity and
modal (really modal) illusions to one which attributes to the subjects
an unintended change in the use of their terms. We try to present such
a theory and its comparative advantages and costs with 2DMS.
We rst present the 2DMS setting, emphasizing how the addition of
a new dimension can help to solve the problem of putting together the
Kripkean account of proper names and the possible world account of
content. This point is a bit tricky because of the various interpretation
of the formal setting of 2DMS: Stalnaker's metasemantic interpretation
seems immune to some of the criticisms aimed at Chalmers's semantic
interpretation. But we see in the second section that the objections
we direct at 2DMS bear on both interpretations. Our main point is
that one should remain faithful in hostile contexts to Kripkean intu-
itions of rigidity which we think continue to adequately characterize the
semantic behavior of singular terms and natural substances terms in
such contexts. When we deal with the same problems that 2DMS was
aretwodimensionstoomany.tex; 19/07/2005; 9:10; p.3
4introduced to solve, we do not say that the subject is not mistaken in be-
lieving what she believes, but we at least suppose that she knows what
she believes. This epistemic candor carries over to the semantic level
by keeping aoat intuitions of rigidity in those places where Fregean
contents were reinstated by 2DMS. We are consequently led to extend
the principle of transworld identity to worlds guring in the content
of beliefs deemed contradictory; hence an enrichment of modal space
with a species of impossible worlds, which we prefer to its duplication by
2DMS. The formalism is introduced in the third section. We spell out a
few semantic requirements and our vision of modal space in paragraphs
3.2 and 3.3. It is remarkable that our one-dimensional modal semantics
(1DMS) both accommodates traditional objections (paragraphs 2.1)
that were formulated against 2DMS as well as our own. As we said, our
particular objections { in paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 { hint back to the idea
that semantic predictions must be subjectively adequate to the sub-
ject. We think that ordinary modal intuitions are better dealt with by
incorporating in our semantics so-called requirements of hyperrigidity
and backward reference to actuality. Those principles state respectively
that the subject keeps the reference of her terms, once rigidly xed, in
every context and that she remains lucid about the kind of departure
from actuality her intuitions may impart. We can easily translate those
requirements in our model, which in one case (hyperrigidity) 2DMS
refuses to do by principle, so to speak, and in the other (backward
reference to actuality) it simply cannot do, as we show below. This
mono-dimensionalist approach is not free lunch. The main hypothesis
supporting its implementation is that proper names are directly used
to refer to individuals in possible situations. Each name comes with
a witness for it, and though it will generally be the case that such a
witness is identical in a certain world with certain objects, no such
thing is necessary from the point of view of the subject. This implies
that we allow for impossible variation of the identity relations in certain
worlds, i.e. we allow for some impossible worlds in order to complete
the picture of the modal space. But it will be argued in paragraph 3.4.
that our reliance on impossible worlds is relatively immune to usual
criticisms against impossible worlds.
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1.1. The formal apparatus of 2DMS
Two-dimensional modal semantics is a modal semantics according to
which expressions are evaluated with respect to pairs of worlds instead
of worlds simpliciter. The idea is that  is true at (w
1
; w
2
) i it would
be true in w
2
, considered as counterfactual, had w
1
been the actual
world. Let's consider the following statements:
() Hesperus appears in the evening sky.
( ) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
Now let w
0
be the actual world, and w
1
a possible world in which the
morning star is still Venus but in which the object appearing in the sky
on the evening is Sirius instead of Venus. In (w
0
,w
0
), reference is xed
in the actual world, and sentences are evaluated in the actual world as
well, so that  and  are both true in (w
0
,w
0
). In (w
0
,w
1
), reference
is still xed in the actual world, so that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus"
both refer to Venus, but the circumstances of evaluations are given by
the counterfactual world w
1
. Because reference xing has not changed,
 is still true, and because facts are dierent,  is false. In (w
1
,w
1
),
reference is xed in w
1
, therefore "Hesperus" refers to Sirius, whereas
"Phosphorus" refers to Venus as before. As a consequence,  will be
false, but as the circumstances of evaluation are given by w
1
,  is true,
since w
1
is possible world in which Sirius appears in the evening sky.
Statements are thus interpreted by a function with two arguments,
this is Stalnaker's notion of propositional concept (Stalnaker 1978). A
propositional concept f(x
1
; x
2
) can express two distinguished proposi-
tions:
i) rst the horizontal one, f(w
0
; x), corresponding to the propo-
sition usually associated to the statement, all reference xing takes
place considering the actual world as actual. To x terminology, this
is Chalmers's secondary intension (Chalmers 1996) and Jackson's C-
intension (Jackson 1998).
ii) The other proposition of special interest is f(x; x), the diagonal
proposition, which gives the truth value of the statement in a world,
that world being considered as actual. This is Chalmers's primary
intension and Jackson's A-intension.
1.2. Expected Advantages
This formal device hopes to solve two kinds of intricate problems.
representation problem Rigid designation generates various seman-
tic puzzles. More precisely, the problem is to make Kripkean rigid-
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tions as sets of possible worlds. One special aspect of this problem
concerns identity statements: if Kripke is right, all true identity
statements 'a=b' are necessarily true. They have therefore the
same truth value in every possible world, and hence the same
propositional content, and this content is trivial. The notion of
propositional content does not seem to give then an adequate
representation of the informative content of these statements.
Another side of the problem concerns beliefs: as long as 'a' and
'b' have the same referent, the propositional content of '(a)' and
'(b)' will be the same, nevertheless, it seems perfectly rational for
an agent to believe both (a) and :(b) in case he does not believe
that a = b. How then can we represent this kind of belief?
epistemological problem This is is the looser problem of providing
a better understanding of the post-Kripkean interplay between the
distinctions a priori / a posteriori (epistemic) and necessary /
contingent (metaphysical). On the traditional view of epistemic
logic, epistemic alternatives for an agent are represented as sets of
possible worlds, and possible worlds are the metaphysically pos-
sible worlds ( what else?). How then could it be that something
necessary is not a priori known or at least knowable?
In a nutshell, 2DMS solves the representation problem by resorting
to primary intensions. "Hesperus is Phosphorus" does not lead to a
necessary diagonal proposition, just because in (w
1
,w
1
), the object
which is the evening star and the object which is the morning star
according to w
1
are dierent. The same idea works with belief: "Hes-
perus is a planet" and "Phosphorus is a planet" are interpreted by
dierent diagonal propositions. In the world w
1
discussed above, the
morning star happens to be Venus; 'Hesperus is a planet' is false in
(w
1
,w
1
) whereas 'Phosphorus is a planet' turns out to be true.
Given that a single statement expresses two dierent propositions,
horizontal and diagonal ones, we have two notions of being true ev-
erywhere. Necessity is interpreted as usual as necessity of the horizon-
tal proposition. Epistemically, one must rst grant that the diagonal
proposition is determined by the descriptive content of terms - rigid
or not. The idea is that one determines the referent of 'Hesperus' in w
considered as actual by asking which object is the evening star inw. The
presupposition is that 'Hesperus' has as descriptive content 'the rst
heavenly body appearing in the evening sky' and that's why 'Hesperus
appears in the evening sky' is true in every (w, w). 'Hesperus appears
in the evening sky' is a priori. More generally, always true diagonal
aretwodimensionstoomany.tex; 19/07/2005; 9:10; p.6
7propositions are true in virtue of the descriptive content, or meanings
of the terms. Therefore, these propositions are a priori.
2
1.3. Semantic vs metasemantic interpretations
Even though 2DMS is a valuable tool in providing the formal setting
to solve these problems, it must be recognized that the validity of its
solution is highly dependent upon non-trivial theses about meaning
and belief. The formalism in and of itself is by no means an argument
for these theses. In particular, there is a persisting disagreement over
the claims of 2DMS to model and explain a priori knowledge: Stalnaker
(Stalnaker 2001) has proposed to label semantic the interpretation of
2DMS according to which the diagonal proposition is a component of
meaning and metasemantic the interpretation according to which the
diagonal proposition only represents the possible variations of meanings
depending on the facts.
The semantic view, defended by Chalmers and Jackson, rests upon
a commitment to descriptivism: to determine the value of 'Hespe-
rus' along the diagonal line, one appeals to the descriptive content
of the name. "Descriptive content" here is tantamount to some kind of
Fregean sense. The existence of such a sense is a necessary condition
for truth everywhere along the diagonal line to be interpretable as a
priori truth. This new form of descriptivism has recently come under
heavy attack: the core argument is that the other kind of intensions the
semantic interpretation presupposes simply do not exist, because the
kind of knowledge they imply cannot be tied to knowledge of meanings.
Arguments here are the same old ones as Kripke's against the descrip-
tive theory of proper names. The competent user of a name does not in
general possess substantial identifying knowledge. The speaker might
fail to have such knowledge, by ignorance (many people do not know
enough about Cicero to be able to identify him uniquely) and by error
(while our beliefs about G

'odel's actions might be false, they would
not prevent us from referring to him). Therefore, mastering the use
of a name does not presuppose knowledge of some kind of identifying
meaning.
The metasemantic view isn't committed to such descriptivism. No
link between a priori truth and truth everywhere along the diagonal line
is suggested. Moreover, there are no a priori truths, since if semantic
facts had been dierent, meanings could have been radically dierent
so that "The meter stick is one meter long" could have meant "Michael
Jackson is ve feet ten inches tall". The solution of the epistemological
problem is partial: on the metasemantic view 2DMS handles well a
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contingent ones.
2. Objections to two-dimensionalism
We rst consider criticisms of 2DMS found in the literature. They bear
mainly upon the semantic interpretation, but we will argue that the way
out suggested by the metasemantic interpretation is not as safe as it
seems. We propose some new criticism of what's wrong in general with
the 2DMS strategy: we introduce two principles governing our modal
intuitions, hyperrigidity and backward reference to actuality. We show
then how 2DMS violates them.
2.1. Descriptivism strikes back
At rst sight, objections against neo-descriptivism are aimed only at
the semantic interpretation. The specicity of the metasemantic in-
terpretation is that, though it uses the diagonal "line" to solve the
representation problem, it does not presuppose that line to be part of
meaning. But, if the diagonal proposition is not part of meaning, how
can it play a role in solving representation problems? This question
is twofold: if the diagonal proposition is not in general the content of
the sentence, how can it be sometimes the proposition expressed? How
can we attribute to speakers the necessary knowledge to determine this
horizontal line, if the knowledge in question isn't semantical?
Stalnaker's answer to the rst question (Stalnaker 1978) is Gricean.
"Under certain conditions, the content of an assertion is not the propo-
sition determined by the ordinary semantic rule, but instead the di-
agonal proposition of the propositional concept determined." And this
happens when some principles about assertions are violated:
3
  Non-triviality: A proposition asserted is always true in some but
not all of the possible worlds in the context set.
4
  Context-independence: The same proposition is expressed relative
to each possible world in the context set.
The diagonal proposition comes into play because because some con-
versational maxims would be violated, had the content been the usual
one, so that the content has to be reinterpreted along the metasemantic
line.
As to the second point, the determination of the diagonal propo-
sition seems to involve reexive semantic competence on behalf of
aretwodimensionstoomany.tex; 19/07/2005; 9:10; p.8
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that words could have meant something other than what they mean,
given the pragmatic fact that they cannot mean what they usually do.
Therefore, through the metasemantic interpretation, Stalnaker wants
to have it both ways: the diagonal proposition does not depend on the
identication of a descriptive content but it is nevertheless available
to solve the representation problem. But this tricky strategy lays itself
open to criticism.
  The access to the metasemantic dimension presupposes nearly as
much of the speakers as would be needed to ll a descriptive con-
tent. If speakers have to master a Kripkean theory of reference
to be able to determine the diagonal proposition expressed by an
assertion, why should we refuse to construe this as constituting
the Fregean sense of proper names?
  The Gricean account works well in the case of possibly trivial as-
sertions, because it is clear that in those cases, some other interpre-
tations have to be found. But there is no such risk of trivialization
with ordinary beliefs involving proper names, when they are taken
one by one, so why should we diagonalize in those cases? And if it is
argued that we face contradiction when one puts together various
such beliefs, so that in general their content should be the diagonal
proposition, this will yield an unexplained systematic dierence
between the content of simple assertions and beliefs ascriptions.
  The semantic interpretation has some strong initial plausibility in
the case of ready-made descriptive names like Evans' Julius, who
is taken to be whoever invented the zip (Evans 1977).
We think one major lesson should be drawn from this rst set of prob-
lems: a solution for the representation problem should be independent
of one's position with respect to the epistemological problem. It should
not depend explicitly on questionable neo-descriptivist assumptions. It
should instead be able to solve the epistemological problem insofar
as these assumptions are true (be it for the whole class of proper
names and natural kind terms or just for a restricted and perhaps
articial subclass of such expressions) and it should not make any
hidden assumption as to the metasemantic reasoning abilities of the
speakers.
2.2. Hyperrigidity
One of the ideas behind 2DMS, according to (Chalmers 2004), is to
reconcile Kripkean and Fregean intuitions. Rigidity is ensured at the
aretwodimensionstoomany.tex; 19/07/2005; 9:10; p.9
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horizontal level, and matters of informativeness and cognitive content
are dealt with at the level of the diagonal proposition, either with some
full-blooded Fregean sense along the lines of the semantic interpretation
or with something more elusive and not semantic on the metasemantic
interpretation.
But is 2DMS really faithful to the Kripkean intuitions to the end?
When a lay astronomer, say O'Leary, believes that Hesperus is not
Phosphorus, he believes of Hesperus and of Phosphorus that they are
not the same star. It happens that Hesperus and Phosphorus are not
two dierent stars, but one and the same planet. If, following Kripke,
identity statements of this form are necessary whenever true, this means
that the lay astronomer considers possible some impossible state of the
world, and moreover believes of this very possibility that it is actualized.
Surprisingly enough, the formal account of O'Leary's belief 2DMS
puts forward is substantially dierent from the informal one we have
just sketched. On the semantic interpretation, "Hesperus is not Phos-
phorus" is not a priori false because there is some possible world w
such that, on considering that world as actual, the objects satisfying de-
scriptive meanings of "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" would be dierent.
That is, "Hesperus is not Phosphorus" will be true in w because at least
one object other than Hesperus, alias Phosphorus, alias Venus, satises
the denite description attached for example to "Hesperus". The way
the reference of "Hesperus" has been xed on the metasemantic account
is more complicated, but the upshot is the same: the sentence will be
true only because the proper names have been reinterpreted to refer
to something dierent from their actual referent. This trick allows the
proponent of 2DMS to nd a (truly) possible world to back up O'Leary
belief in something impossible, but this trick amounts to a renunciation.
For w to be the witness we need, the requirement of rigidity has to
be relaxed. Maybe here the neo-descriptivist can bite the bullet and
show that abandoning rigidity is necessary to account for descriptive
meaning. The proponent of the metasemantic view could also reply that
Kripke is not betrayed in so far as we are on a metasemantic account,
so that the name "Hesperus" does not only change its reference, but
becomes a dierent name. But anyway, O'Leary is betrayed at least as
much as Kripke: O'Leary belief was about Hesperus and Phosphorus, he
believed that they are dierent objects, he would not regard the idea of
another object coming into play to become the referent of "Hesperus"
as an adequate way to construe his belief, and that is also precisely
the reason why we, as well-informed astronomers, think he is believing
something impossible.
aretwodimensionstoomany.tex; 19/07/2005; 9:10; p.10
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Another unwelcome consequence is that our disagreement with O'Leary
on the 2DMS approach to the representation problem turns into a
verbal dispute. It is not really that we regard as impossible a world
O'Leary regards as possible and actual, it is rather that O'Leary regards
as possible that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are names dierent from
what they are. Surely this description of the disagreement is not faithful
to the intuitions of the speakers. On the contrary, it seems that we are
engaged in a substantial disagreement with O'Leary.
Nevertheless, one could argue that the 2DMS approach is in keeping
with Kripke's own suggestions in Naming and Necessity. According to
Kripke, the epistemic possibility that Hesperus and Phosphorus turn
out to be two dierent stars is not really the possibility that Hesperus
is not Phosphorus. Such possibility does not exist, since the identity
between Hesperus and Phosphorus is true and necessarily true. Rather
we envisage the possibility of a situation in which we would be in the
same epistemic state as we are and in which 'Hesperus' and 'Phospho-
rus' would be used to name other objects. But here it is important
to distinguish two claims: the metaphysical claim that the epistemic
possibility does not give way to a genuine possibility, and the repre-
sentational claim that the epistemic possibility should be construed
as a genuine possibility if we modify the language. The rst claim is
established by usual argument in favor of rigidity, but the shift of the
rst claim to the second one is a non sequitur. Moreover, this shift seems
to be in conict with Kripke's view about access to possible worlds.
According to Kripke, names should be regarded as rigid designators
because worlds are not things waiting around there to be explored
and described. On the contrary, our access to counterfactual situations
depends on our ability to use proper names to x what we are speaking
about. When we entertain the idea that Aristotle could have never
studied with Plato, there is no back-up description of Aristotle (x)
such that what we are thinking about is that {x(x) could have never
studied with Plato. Similarly, our access to a counterfactual situation
according to which Hesperus is not Phosphorus should not depend on
some qualitative description, but be the direct consequence of an act
of referring. And this contradicts Kripke's claim that this epistemic
possibility should be construed as a genuine possibility modulo a change
in language .
5
Supporters of 2DMS have no clear counter-arguments with respects
to the hypothesis of epistemic rigidity, that is to say, the fact that
a subject preserves, or may preserve, the habitual reference of his
rigid terms in all contexts, including in contects in which an essential
property of the objects to which the terms in question customarily
refer is negated. Epistemic rigidity mlay be accompanied, to some ex-
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tent, by the consciousness that the subject expresses an impossibility
regarding the objects that form the habitual reference of his terms,
and nevertheless think that she expresses well that impossibility with
respect to those objects. It is just when the subject is not conscious of
expressing an impossibility, but does not change the habitual reference
of his terms, that she may be said to be victim of modal illusion. Faced
with the idea of preservation of intensional identity of the reference of
rigid terms, the 2-dimensional semanticist deploys in an unacceptable
manner an argument of Kripkean derivation. Essential properties of an
object, so it goes, would justify the change in reference of the terms
in the context where the predication of those properties with respect
to the object is implicitly or explicitly negated. In other words, the
2-dimensionalist is tempted to use the metaphysical thesis that there
are essential properties in service to a certain theory of reference and
thus do as if violations of essentialism may justify locally a change in
the reference of the terms concerned. But the Kripkean order of reason
is precisely the opposite : intuitions of rigidity regarding proper names
and natural kind terms give a precise logical semantic basis (through
the notion of identity across possible worlds) to the independent meta-
physical notion that objects have some of their properties essentially.
The rigidity thesis is not itself dependent on the existence of essential
properties.
From our point of view, the lesson to be drawn from the second set
of criticisms is that the solution to the representation problem should
not consist in giving up rigidity or in appealing to change in language.
That is we should satisfy the following principle:
Hyperrigidity principle: Rigid terms do not loose their rigidity
when they are embedded in knowledge claims or in illusory modal
claims.
The partial solution to the epistemological problem 2DMS brings
about explains away our modal illusions, that is the fact that we can
conceive of impossible state of aairs. We can conceive, and we can
even believe that water is not H2O; but according to 2DMS, this does
not mean that we can conceive some metaphysically impossible state
of aairs, rather what we conceive is to be taken into account through
a change as to which world is regarded as actual and reference x-
ing. In contradistinction with such a solution bypassing the subject's
intuitions, we put forward the hyperrigidity principle as a subjective
adequacy constraint on formalization of content.
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2.3. Backward reference to actuality
Our second argument against 2DMS and our corresponding positive
principle concerns its lack of expressive power relative to a number of
simple cases : cases in which the contrast between the impossibility
considered by a subject and the actual state of aairs is explicitly
entertained. For example " Water could have had a dierent chemical
structure from the one it actually has ". Modal intuitions typically
present this kind of contrast. From a cognitive standpoint, that corre-
sponds to a certain lucidity on the part of the subject with respect to
the possibility or impossibility that he considers. More exactly, the fact
of considering that modal intuition does not imply that the subject
is ignorant about the actual state of aairs, nor that she refuses to
consider that the model judgment that she formulates is not relative
to actuality. In the case in which the contrast with actuality is thus
suÆciently indicated in the modal judgment of the epistemic agent,
2DMS becomes an inadequate formal framework to give an account of
such a judgment. The diÆculty for the 2DMS framework arises from a
logical contradiction that appears in the scope of the modal operator
associated to the procedure that consists in taking a certain world as
counter-actual (at the basis of the selection of a primary intension),
where the backward reference to actuality is an explicit component of
the modal judgment.
Let's specify the intuitive contrasts at stake and see when they give
rise to a contradiction or not, and let's consider this as an interesting
test of expressivity of 2DMS in the face of natural modal intuitions.
Modal intuitions are contrastive in the sense that they imply con-
scious departures from actuality. Contrasts can come in several ways. In
one way I x actuality as I know it and wonder how dierent than it is it
could have been or might be. My intuitions then relate to actuality and
I consider its possibly alternative states. In some such occasions I may
further suppose that one of these states is the actual one and I mentally
cancel out the contrast that made that alternative state salient. In an-
other way I focus on the alternative, counterfactual state and I remain
lucid about its implied departures from actuality. I never pretend that
it is an actual state. 2DMists have respectively labeled these intuitive
procedures 'considering a world as actual' and 'considering a world as
counterfactual', and associated with them dual logical, linguistic and
conceptual realizations. Our point, here, is that considering a world
as actual is tantamount to an attempt at canceling out the contrastive
relation our modal intuition bears to actuality whereas considering it as
counterfactual consists in keeping this contrast under focus. This point
bears on its sleeves an attempted conciliation of a formal account with
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signicant cognitive features of our modal intuitions. The problem is
that not all kinds of contrasts and only rather unsubstantial ones will
be properly captured by a 2DMS account. This is due to a contra-
diction arising in the scope of the modal operator associated with the
'considering a world as actual' procedure when a backward reference to
actuality is an essential feature of the corresponding modal intuition.
In some cases however this reference to actuality is not essential and
apart from particular epistemic conditions which block the soundness
of the projection into counteractuality mechanism even in those cases,
2DMS has a grip on them. Let's see some examples.
6
(1) Water could have a chemical structure dierent from H20.
(2) Water could have had a chemical structure dierent from the
one it actually has.
(1) is the kind of metaphysical impossibility 2DMS is t to account
for. For (1) to be true, according to 2DMS, reference-xing must takes
place in a world dierent from the actual one: if the drinkable stu
found in lake and oceans is XYZ in w
1
, then, as long as we consider w
1
as actual, the reference of "water" will be XYZ. The important point is
that for (1) to be true, a new "actual" world must be selected, that is
the contrast between w
1
and the truly actual world must be canceled,
we have to do as if w
1
was the actual world. Formally, let's assume, for
the sake of simplicity, that "water" and "H20" are proper names. We
will use a rigid function f which associates to each natural substance
its chemical structure. (1) is then parsed as 3f(a) 6= b. f({xA(x)) 6= b
will be true in the pair of worlds (w
1
; x) where w
1
is a world considered
as actual diering from the actual world as to which substance plays
the role of water, because the reference of a will be determined through
{xA(x) by jumping to w
1
whatever x is.
Now (2) being a metaphysical impossibility, such a modal illusion
should be explained away in two-dimensional terms in the same way,
by postulating a counteractual world in which a chemical structure
which H20 does not actually possess applies to water in that world.
A rst reading of my modal intuition is that it seems to me that it
could actually be that water, which actually has chemical structure
H20, has chemical structure XYZ. However a backward reference to
actuality in the content of the modal judgement entails a contradiction.
The apparent solution would be to apply the same innocuous variation
procedure as in (1). But it won't do for a simple reason. (2) does not
mean that the chemical stu chosen as water in a certain counteractual
condition has a dierent chemical structure than water has. I mean
that actual water has, counteractually, a dierent chemical structure
than it actually has. Actual water and its actual chemical structure
irreducibly gure in the content of my modal intuitions as the M2D
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should faithfully intend to spell it out, and this generates an explicit
contradiction in the 2DMS account of that intuition.
Let's make this point again in formal terms. (2) must be parsed
as 3f(a) 6= [{yAy = f(a)]. Expanding a, we obtain 3f({xA(x)) 6=
[{yAy = f({xA(x))]. But, on the usual interpretation of A, if f is
rigid,
7
f({xA(x)) 6= [{yAy = f({xA(x))] is false in every pair or
worlds.
8
Therefore, 2DMS cannot take into account the conceivability
of (2), and this is because its explanation of (1) rests upon a shift
in actuality which prevents from taking into account the backward
reference to actuality made explicit in (2).
Proponents of 2DMS might wish to deny that (2) is really con-
ceivable; but this way out would be ad hoc. If it is conceivable that
water is not H2O, it is because it is conceivable, even though it is not
metaphysically possible, that water has a chemical structure dierent
from the one it actually has. No account allowing for (1) but not for
(2) to be conceivable will do. On the contrary, a satisfactory account
of conceivability must allow for such backward reference as "dierent
from the one it actually has". 2DMS has a problem with that, because
it rests upon considering change as to which world is actual. In con-
tradistinction with that limitation, a satisfactory solution should abide
by the following principle:
Backward reference principle Modal claims, even illusory ones,
are grounded in the ability to conceive possibilities explicitly diering
from reality.
3. One-dimensional semantics revisited
3.1. Rigid designation and impossible worlds
According to possible world semantics, the content of a sentence can
be represented as a set of worlds, namely the set of worlds in which the
sentence is true. We can take this representation to be a mere semantic
machinery aimed at deriving correct predictions (e.g. concerning which
sentences entail which ones). Nevertheless, something more is expected
from a correct semantics it should reect faithfully what it is for a
speaker to understand a sentence. This is the gist of possible world
semantics: understanding a sentence boils down to knowing which pos-
sible states of aairs verify it. In this sense, semantic knowledge involves
not only the ability to evaluate a sentence in the actual world, but
also the ability to evaluate the sentence in a possible state of aairs,
that is the ability to conceive of what the world had to be like for
the sentence to be true or false. The representation of content based on
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possible worlds has then to be linked with speakers' abilities to conceive
of possible of worlds. On the contrary, if we take the possible worlds
used to represent content to be cognitively inaccessible to the speakers,
semantic competence remains a mystery, because speakers do not have
access to the content as characterized by the theory.
The point of the criticisms against the descriptive elements common
to both semantic and meta-semantic interpretations of 2DMS is that
this access remains mysterious: in general, speakers do not possess a
descriptive content attached to proper names, nor do they master a
theory of how worldly facts inuence reference xing for proper names.
On the contrary, the Kripkean story about possible worlds provides
us with a clear account of our acquaintance with possible worlds. A
possible world is just an ascription of certain properties to the individ-
uals we refer to in our language. I can refer to Cicero using the word
"Cicero" and on this basis, I can imagine that some properties apply
to him and that some others do not. Thus, I can conceive that Cicero
was not an orator, and this ability is grounded in the use of "Cicero"
as a directly referential term, which calls Cicero before our mind's eye
so to speak and makes for a possibility in which we can attribute to
him a wide range of properties, without paying any kind of respect
to a putative descriptive content of the name. But as easily as I can
conceive that Cicero was not an orator, I can play with the idea that he
was not Marcus Tullius, so that I can consistently believe that Cicero
is not Marcus Tullius. Here the Kripkean story falls short of giving an
explanation in terms of real possibility, because if "Cicero" and "Marcus
Tullius" both directly refer to some object, there is no room for a failure
of coreference. But if what we are after is an account of our modal
competence, that is an account of conceivability, in contradistinction
with an account of metaphysical possibility, there is no reason to stop
here. The object summoned up by the use of the word "Cicero" and
the object summoned up by the use of the words "Marcus Tullius" do
not have to be the same: as far as I use them to conceive of various
situations, it can be the case that they are identical, but it is equally
possible that they are not. What I can conceive is constrained by the
language I use, I cannot imagine that Cicero is not Cicero, because
in this case there are no two names to be used to evoke two dierent
objects. On the contrary, metaphysical possibility does not limit what
I can conceive, I can perfectly well imagine that Cicero is not Marcus
Tullius, because I can condently use these two names to evoke two
objects which might be dierent. According to this view, when we try
to model conceivability, we should not take identity to be xed once
and for all: this means that it should be considered as a varying relation
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which can hold or fail to hold between the objects which are summoned
up by the names.
Our talk of names "summoning up" objects and of identity being a
"varying" relation might seem mysterious: where do these objects come
from, if they are not the real objects dealt with by metaphysical pos-
sibility? how can identity be something else than sheer identity? Here
comes the substantial thesis, which determines our modeling choices:
in terms of conceivability, each name directly refers to an object which
we take to be some kind of witness for the name. This object does not
have to be an object which actually exist or which could metaphysically
exist: it is just so to speak the shadow of the name on which our
conceiving abilities rely on. Of course, if the possibilities we imagine
are to be full-edged metaphysical possibilities, these shadow objects
have to identical to some real objects: a conceivable state of aairs
about Cicero and Marcus Tullius is a real possibility if and only if the
mental witnesses for Cicero and Marcus Tullius are both identical to
the Roman man who was actually Marcus Tullius Cicero.
Now, it might seems that we endorse two contradictory claims. First,
that names rigidly refer to a witness, second that coreferential names
can fail to corefer in some possible worlds. But a contradiction follows
only if identity is taken to be strongly necessary, that is if two objects
which are identical in one world have to be identical in every world. This
fact is a byproduct of the usual interpretation of equality as a logical
notion, namely as real identity on every world. But if we deal with
witnesses, it is very natural to construe equality as non-logical notion,
namely a congruence relation on models: a witness can be identical to
a real object in the actual world, and identical to no real object in
another world (failure of reference), or might fail in a possible world to
be identical to the object it is identical to in the actual world (when I
don't know if Cicero is Tullius).
To sum, we have just advocated a framework based on the idea that
names rigidly refer to witnesses which are together with actual objects
the building blocks of possible worlds. Our task in the next sections will
consist in giving such a semantics and showing that it does as well as
2DMS without being subject to the criticisms we addressed to 2DMS.
Before stating the principles our semantics should abide by, let us
mention two consequences of our witness-driven approach to possible
worlds, though, in the interest of space, we shall not develop them
in this paper. First, ction names and referring names are treated
on a par: "Cicero" is associated with a witness it rigidly refers to in
all conceivable worlds, and the same is true for "Pegasus", the only
dierence between the two is that, if I know that Pegasus is nothing
but a ction, there is no belief world in which its witness is identical to
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a real object.
9
. We take this similarity to be a welcome consequence of
our approach: if our ability to conceive of various possibilities involving
Pegasus or Cicero is triggered by our use of these names to summon
up a witness which is their xed reference across conceivable worlds,
there is no reason not to treat "Cicero" and "Pegasus" on a par, since
they are both just proper names we can use to engage in imagining
possibilities, quite independently of the fact that some people actually
got acquainted with Cicero whereas nobody ever had the pleasure to
meet Pegasus.
Another consequence of our approach is the following asymmetry
between conceivability and (metaphysical) possibility. The second one
is language independent: Cicero cannot be anyone but Marcus Tullius,
and this fact remains unaltered by "Cicero" and "Marcus Tullius" be-
ing two dierent names. On the other hand, conceivability is indeed
language dependent: the weird conceivable world in which Cicero is
dierent from Marcus Tullius mirrors the linguistic fact that we have
two names at hand to refer to the same real world individual. Once
again, we think this is a rather welcome consequence: the conceivable
state of aair in question cannot be made sense of independently from
the language we use to describe it.
10
3.2. Semantic requirements
We want to model at once knowledge and possibility, therefore we will
use a languages with three kinds of modalities: on top of an undeter-
mined modality 3
C
corresponding to conceivability, we add a modality
3
M
to deal with metaphysical possibility and the necessary / contin-
gent distinction, and another one 3
E
to deal with epistemic or doxastic
possibility and the a priori / a posteriori distinction. Moreover, each
language L goes with a synonymy function syn
L
from names to open
formulas. To make the link with Evans' descriptive names and their
account in 2DMS, the fact that Julius = {xActually (x), where (x)
is x invented the zip, will be regarded as a semantic property of the
Language L, namely that syn
L
(Julius) = (x). In contradistinction to
2DM formal languages studied in (Davies and Humberstone 1980), we
have no actuality operator. We do not speak of the synonymy relations
explicitly in the language
11
syn
L
will be dened nowhere if they are
no descriptive names, and if some strong version of neo-descriptivism
is true, syn
L
will be a total function assigning to each name a its sense
as given by a denite description {x
a
(x).
We want the following principles to be validated by our semantics:
1. Non-trivialization: a = b ^ 
E
a 6= b is satisable though 2
C
a = a
is valid.
12
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2. Aprioricity:
if syn
L
(a) = (x), then 2
E
(a), but this does not imply 2
M
(a)
2
M
a = b 2 2
E
a = b
3. Necessity of identity: a = b! 2
M
((9x x = a_ 9x x = b)! a = b)
is valid.
4. Hyperrigidity: 9x (x = a ^2
C
(9y y = a! x = a) is valid.
5. Backward reference to actuality: 3
C
f(a) 6= b is satisable with f
rigid and b L-synonymous with {y y = f(a).
These principles are intended to ensure that the representation and
epistemological problems can be given a solution (requirements 1. and
2.), such that this solution is both Kripkean in a way reminiscent of
2DMS (requirements 3. and partially 4.) and immune to our previous
objections (requirements 2., 4. and 5.).
More precisely, 1. is meant to ensure that the trivialization of content
that paves the way to the representation problem does not arise.
2. is intended to capture the fact that semantic facts provide a priori
knowledge and that a priori knowledge is not tied to metaphysical
necessity, as (Kripke 1980) has shown. Kripke's examples of a priori
and contingent statements  will lead to situations in which 2
E
(a)
but not 2
M
(a) is true. The case 2
M
 true and 2
E
 false corresponds
to a necessary a posteriori  . The solution oered to the epistemological
problem is neutral with respect to neo-descriptivism: a priori knowledge
will be explained only in so far as some form of descriptivism is true
(that is only in so far as some synonymy is given) and it does not
presuppose some hidden metasemantic reasoning abilities on behalf of
the speakers.
Necessity of identity statements is expressed by 3., the simpler a =
b ! 2a = b will not do, unless existence is assumed to be necessary.
But even though there is someone who is Michael Jackson in the actual
world, it seems to be metaphysically possible that Michael Jackson does
not exist. But being granted that Michael Jackson is Peter Pan, there
is no possible world in which either Michael Jackson or Peter Pan but
not both do not exist.
To be fully Kripkean, one needs rigidity; in our setting, rigidity in all
metaphysically possible world is a particular case of hyperrigidity, if we
assume that every metaphysically possible state of aairs is conceivable.
4. expresses hyperrigidity as a property of conceivable content. If I can
conceive something about a, which is the case as soon as a is part of
my language, then ipso facto I can use a in de re attitudes. Under the
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reasonable assumption that epistemic alternatives are conceivable, 4.
implies 2
E
(a)  9x x = a ^2
E
(x).
As long as 5. is validated, our semantics will be immune to the
objection relying on backward reference raised against 2DMS. Never-
theless, one could object that 5. is far from implementing the backward
reference principle itself, precisely because we have no actuality opera-
tor. This objection is partially misguided, because an operator actually
can be at least dened in certain contexts. To express that something
is dierent from what it actually is identical to, that is to express
y 6= {x A(x) one can use x 6= b with b synonymous with {x (x).
3.3. One-dimensional semantics with metaphysically
impossible worlds
In order to solve the representation problem, it is necessary to extend
in some sense the range of possibility. Following the possible worlds
account of content, for "a=b" to be informative, there must be some
possible world in which it is false that "a=b". If the Kripkean thesis of
the necessity of identity statements is right, then one has to look be-
yond the normal possible worlds to nd the worlds excluded by "a=b".
The solution of 2DMS is very special: no new possible are added, but
possible worlds, usually construed as counterfactual alternatives to the
actual world, are reconstrued as actual alternatives (this is the gist of
the second dimension). This is why the 2DMS solution is both nice and
problematic: it is nice, because no new worlds are needed to account
the informativeness of necessary true statements, but it is problematic
because necessary statements can become false, only if they are recon-
strued as statements about dierent things (semantic interpretation)
or as statements in another language (metasemantic interpretation). A
more straightforward solution to the representation problem would be
to take into account more worlds than just the metaphysically possible
worlds and more generally to distinguish at the worlds level between
metaphysical and epistemic possibilities.
Which new worlds could be added beyond the metaphysically pos-
sible ones? Our guiding intuition is that the agent accesses possible
worlds via rigid terms like proper names. The solution consists then in
adding to the stock of individuals witnesses or counterparts for names,
so that what can be imagined thanks to names can be realized in a
possible - possibly metaphysically impossible - world. Technically, the
trick is to interpret equality not as identity but as a congruence; this
is standard model-theoretic practice.
13
We now spell out the one-dimensional modal semantics with identity
(1DMS) we propose as a rival to 2DMS. Let L be a language with
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equality, N
L
is the set of rigid terms, that is proper names of L and
terms of the form f(a) if f is a function expressing some necessary
property of a, syn
L
a synonymy function for L. A 1DM model for L
will be a 8-uplet hW;w
0
; R
C
; R
M
; R
E
; D;Q; V i such that:
  W is a set (of 'worlds').
  w
0
is a distinguished element of W ('the actual world')
  D is another set (of 'individuals'), containing witnesses for each
rigid term in L, that is D  fwit
a
g
a2N
L
.
  Q is a function from W to D (Q(w) is the set of individuals which
'exist' in w).
  V is a function from W  V oc(L), such that V (w; e) is made out
of Q(w) in a way matching the syntactic type of e (V 'interprets'
the non logical basic expressions of L in the dierent worlds). Two
specials constraints concerns rigid terms and the interpretation of
equality. We do not require V to be totally dened for names
14
, but
if V (w; a) is dened, V (w; a) = wit
a
and if wit
a
2 Q(w), V (w; a)
is dened. This will ensures that names are rigid designators.
Similarly, if f(a) is a rigid term and if V (w; f(a)) is dened,
V (w; f(a)) = wit
f(a)
, and if wit
f(a)
2 Q(w), V (w; f(a)) is dened.
As to
0
=
0
, we require that V (w;=) is a congruence on hQ(w); V (w)i.
  R
C
is a relation on W .
  R
M
is a relation on the set of metaphysically possible worlds. A
world w is metaphysically possible i V (w;=) and V (w
0
;=) agree
on Q(w
0
) \Q(w), and if V (w; a) is dened and ha; bi 2 V (w
0
;=)
then V (w; b) is dened.
  R
E
is a relation dened on the set of epistemically possible worlds
such that R
E
 R
C
. A world w is epistemically possible i if
syn
L
(a) = (x), then V (w; a) is dened i 9!x (x) is true in w
and if V (w; a) is dened, then (a) is true in w.
It is now routine to check that the semantic requirements hold.
Non-trivialization holds because we allow the equality relation to
vary across possible worlds: ha; bi 2 V (w
0
;=) does not force ha; bi 2
V (w;=) for a w 6= w
0
. This freedom comes from the fact that we decide
to construe = by a congruence relation instead of construing it by the
identity relation. Of course this is in a sense cheating, because if in the
real world w
0
, there is a real object d such that d = wit
a
= wit
b
, there
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can be no metaphysically possible world where d and the two witness
wit
a
and wit
b
split. But this is metaphysical cheating, not epistemic:
from an epistemic point of view, this is perfectly possible, because the
only way for a speaker to track objets named through possible worlds
is to use the names, and nothing prevents him from thinking that the
objects tracked by a and b are dierent, in which case for example the
real object a might split into wit
a
and wit
b
, sharing out a's properties.
Finally, since "=" is interpreted by a reexive relation, there is no
problem with a = a.
The rst part of aprioricity, namely if syn
L
(a) = (x), then 2
E
(a),
follows directly from the denition of epistemically possible worlds.
But it will in general not be the case in metaphysically possible worlds
that (a) holds, it will be false in all metaphysically possible worlds
which are not epistemically possible, which leaves room for a priori
contingent statements. In the same manner, 2
M
a = b 2 2
E
a = b is
ok because of the epistemically worlds which are not metaphysically
possible. Moreover, as expected, 1DMS is neutral with respect to the
truth of neo-descriptivism: the rst part of 2. has content only if one
accepts descriptive names, but the formalism is perfectly compatible
with a language coming with no synonymy relation. That's why we say
that 1DMS is more neutral with respect to the choice of a theory of
meaning than 2DMS, because 2DMS has to systematically explain how
the diagonal proposition is determined, and this is not an easy task on
both interpretations of 2DMS.
The rigidity requirement results from the denition of metaphysi-
cally possible world.
Hyperrigidity holds because there is a built-in witness for the rst
existential quantier of 9x (x = a ^ 2
C
(9y y = a ! x = a) in the
model, namely wit
a
.
Requirement 5., which corresponds to the backward reference prin-
ciple, will be satised as well, because even though f(a) = b is true in
the actual world and f(a) rigidly refers to wit
f(a)
, f(a) 6= b is true in
a world w where (wit
f(a)
; wit
b
) is not in V (w;=). This world w is nei-
ther metaphysically nor epistemically possible: it is not metaphysically
possible, because V (w;=) is substantially dierent from V (w
0
;=) and
it is not epistemically possible, because b = f(a) is false in w. This is
the desired result, because 7. says that something is conceivable which
we know a priori to be false, and which, if false, is necessarily false.
Satisfying at once 1., 2. and 4. is distinctive of 1DMS. Let's draw
the comparison with other modal semantics.
Usual modal semantics In a classical modal setting, "=" is treated
as a logical symbol, so that it is interpreted on all models by
aretwodimensionstoomany.tex; 19/07/2005; 9:10; p.22
23
identity. Then, either names are treated as rigid expressions or
not. If they are, if a = b is true somewhere, it is true everywhere
15
,
therefore 1. will not hold, that's why there is a representation
problem with usual modal logic. If not, 3. and 4. will of course
fail. For example, in Hintikka's approach (Hintikka 1971), singular
terms are associated with "individual concepts", which are ways
of picking out the individuals they refer to in worlds considerer as
possible by the agent. Then in general names are not rigid. (1DMS)
departs therefore radically from this kind of approach because it
insists on the acceptance of 4., that is on the acceptance of rigidity
in all kind of intensional contexts. It does not embrace some kind of
counterpart theory similar to (Lewis 1968): witnesses and objects
in general are taken to be transworld entities, so that we do not
need of course to resort to a counterpart relation across worlds.
2DMS Here the problem is with 4.: 2DMS will indeed account for the
fact that "Julius is Whitcomb L. Judson" is not a priori. But this
will be false in a 'diagonal' pair of worlds (w;w) just because in
(w;w) the inventor of the zip is someone else, that is just because
Julius is not who he is in the actual world. And this point is highly
open to criticism: it licenses Stalnaker's objection to the semantic
interpretation of Chalmers, because in (w;w) "Julius" has changed
its meaning, and it licenses our objection according to which 2DMS
unduly gives up rigidity.
Impossible worlds semantics The appeal to metaphysically impos-
sible worlds has been widely advertised as a solution to various
kind of representation problems. For example, Restall (Restall
1997) proposes an ontologically acceptable interpretation of im-
possible worlds as sets of possible worlds to deal with logical om-
niscience. In his setting, a = b ^ 3
E
a 6= b is indeed satisable,
because one can mix up individuals as well as one can confuse
worlds, the technical trick being to replace in impossible worlds
identity with an equivalence relation to interpret equality. The
spirit of this solution is similar to ours, but its implementation has
unwelcome consequences, in that it leads to too much impossibil-
ity for the impossible worlds. In particular, the semantics makes
2(a 6= b! a 6= a) valid, therefore we cannot but have the last part
of 1. violated if we want the rst part as a solution to the represen-
tation problem.We do not wish here to take a stand as to whether a
semantics which makes a 6= a satisable is needed to solve the full
range of representation problems, including logical omniscience.
Nevertheless, this seems far from obvious, and anyway it should
not arguably come as part and parcel of an explanation of the
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semantic and epistemological problems we are dealing with in this
paper.
3.4. Objections to metaphysically impossible worlds
Even if a proponent of 2DMS grants that we should be happy with
1DMS satisfying both 1., 2. and 4., he might argue that the nice thing
with 2DMS, namely that it does not appeal to new impossible world,
is lost, so that our solution comes at the hight cost of assuming the
existence of weird entities. If this criticism amounts to the rejection of
the sheer idea of impossible worlds, we cannot but acknowledge that
this is the price to pay in order to stay one-dimensional. Nevertheless,
the price is not so high as it might rst appear; the common objections,
as well as Stalnaker's own special ones, against impossible worlds as
used to solve the problem of logical omniscience do not apply here:
16
change of meaning The most standard objection is that the meaning
of logical expressions is betrayed in the impossible worlds. For ex-
ample, nothing prevents one from assuming the existence of a world
w where p and :p are both true, but in this case, : simply cannot
be interpreted as the classical negation; in particular, elementary
logical laws of course do fail in impossible worlds, and it seems
to be that satisfying these laws is a denitional property of the
expressions involved. The situation of equality in our setting is far
less desperate:
17
let's look at what happens to the usual axioms
for identity. Reexivity, symmetry and transitivity are valid, this
follows from V (w;=) being an equivalence relation for every w.
Things are slightly more complicated for the indiscernability of
identicals: since V (w;=) is a congruence for every w, identicals are
substituable salva veritate in non-modal formulas. But of course,
this does not hold for modal formulas, simply because even though
a = b, modalities in a formula  can lead to a world in which
a = b is no more true. In order to have substituatibility, one needs
therefore either to restrict the range of formulas to non-modal ones,
or to strengthen the identity conditions, by replacing a = b with
2a = b.
ontological profusion Another common objection is that there are
simply no such things as impossible worlds, so that 1DMS would
depend on unrealistic ontological assumptions.
First note that there should be nothing wrong in itself with inter-
preting '=' by an equivalence relation instead of identity on mod-
els. Assume w
0
= hQ(w
0
); V w
0
i represents the actual world and
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that V (w
0
;=) is the identity on Q(w
0
). Adopting 1DMS amounts
just to looking at w
0
in a slightly dierent way. Let f
N
L
be a func-
tion onQ(w
0
) such that f
N
L
(d) = fwit
b
=b is a name and V (w
0
; b) =
dg [ d. We dene w
0
0
= hQ(w
0
0
); V (w
0
0
)i by setting:
  Q(w
0
0
) =
S
f
N
L
(Q(w
0
))
  if b is a name and it is dened in W
0
, V (w
0
0
; b) = wit
b
  let P be a n-ary predicate, hd
1
; :::; d
n
i is in V (w
0
0
; P ) i hd
0
1
; :::; d
0
n
i
is in V (w
0
; P ) where d
0
i
is the d 2 jW
0
j such that d
0
i
2 f
N
L
(d)
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It is easy to check that V (w
0
0
;=) will be a congruence on w
0
0
and
that w
0
is the the quotient structure induced by V (w
0
0
;=) on w
0
0
.
That's why we can say that W
0
0
is just another way to look at W
0
.
As to the witnesses wit
b
i
in general, they are just the object the
agent projects from the names b
i
to represent the possible worlds;
one could take them to be the b
i
themselves, or some construction
out of them.
arbitrariness of the delineation of possibilities In Stalnaker's philo-
sophical dialogue (Stalnaker 1996), Louis, who is loath to resort
to impossible worlds addresses the following complaint to his more
liberal companion:"By using the world 'possible' to distinguish
between the possible worlds, you are ruining the good old world
'possible'. [...] you owe me an explanation of what distinction be-
tween the worlds you are using the word 'possible' to make." We
do owe Louis the same explanation with respect to 'metaphysi-
cally possible' and 'epistemically possible', but this explanation is
straightforwardly read o our formal denitions for 1DMS: for a
world to be metaphysically possible, it has to abide by the meta-
physical principle that identities between names are necessary, for
a world to be epistemically possible, it has to take into account the
a priori knowledge embodied in the mastery of synonymy relation
of the language.
contagion of impossibility There is a follow up to Louis' objection:
impossibilities cannot be assumed to be contained to impossible
worlds. Suppose there is a world w such that both P and :P
are true in w, then, so the argument goes,
0
in w; P
0
is actually
true, and
0
in w; :P
0
as well, but if we accept that
0
in w; :P
0
is
logically equivalent to
0
:in w; P
0
, we will have a true contradiction
in the actual world as well. But this strategy does not seem to
apply here, because there is nothing wrong with
0
in w
0
; a = b
0
and
0
in w; a 6= b
0
, because one should not accept the equivalence
between
0
in w; a 6= b
0
and 3
M
a 6= b.
aretwodimensionstoomany.tex; 19/07/2005; 9:10; p.25
26
Conclusion
Our ability to conceive of possible state of aairs is grounded in our
rigid use of referential terms. According to this basic intuition, rigidity
is not a special feature of metaphysically possible worlds: some stronger
version of it, namely hyperrigidity, should hold in every possible world,
be it a mere epistemic possibility or a mere conceivable state of aairs.
As a consequence, we take it that our attitudes towards individuals
referred to by proper names are always de re: even when I consider as
possible that Cicero might not be Marcus Tullius, it is something that
I consider as possible of Cicero and of Marcus Tullius. This approach
diers radically from the usual ways of making compatible Kripke's
theses and the possible world analysis of content. Typically, 2DMS
represents the belief that Cicero is not Marcus Tullius by resorting to
a possible world in which at least one of the two names has dropped its
usual reference. We have argued that this was not satisfactory and that
one should be Kripkean all the way long. The semantics we sketched,
1DMS, shows that it is indeed possible, if one grants that conceivable
state of aairs that are not metaphysically possible should indeed be
modeled by impossible worlds.
Notes
1
This way of seeing things should not be attributed only to explicit advocates
of 2DMS like Chalmers. Contemporary proponents of Hintikkean analysis of belief
often assume implicitly the possibility of such a reconciliation of the two theories
(See e.g. Aloni M., 2005).
2
A thorough presentation and defense of these claims, once held by Stalnaker in
(Stalnaker 1978), can be found in (Chalmers 2004).
3
These principles are primarily formulated as conversational principles governing
assertions made in certain contexts, but they are suppose to apply also to belief
ascriptions.
4
The context set expresses the background knowledge presupposed at the current
stage of the conversation.
5
"But being put in a situation where we have exactly the same evidence, qualita-
tively speaking, it could have turned out that Hesperus was not Phosphorus; that is,
in a counterfactual world in which 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' were not used in the
way that we use them, as names of this planet, but as names of some other objects,
one could have had qualitatively identical evidence and concluded that 'Hesperus'
and 'Phosphorus' named two dierent objects (Kripke 1980: 104).
6
Stephen Yablo, in "Illusions of Possibility" underlines ways in which actuality
can gure in the content of modal judgements. In particular he says: "The thing
that seems possible - the condition that seems like it could have obtained - can have
the concept of actuality in it. This is in fact quite common. People say, for example,
"It's cold in here but it could have been colder". Colder than what? Colder than it
was actually, of course." (Yablo 200?).
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7
That is, for all w
1
, x, y the interpretation of f in (w
1
; x) and (w
1
; y) is the same
8
Just because all A operators points to the same world, and f(x) in (w,w
0
) is the
same as f(x) in (w,w) by rigidity of f , so that f(x) and {yAy = f(x) are everywhere
the same.
9
Technically, this would yield a free logic with an outer domain semantics, objects
in the outer domain being those witnesses such that every objects they are identical
to is a witness.
10
Of course, we do not wish to collapse conceivability onto the mere possibility
of stating a grammatical sentence. It will be clear that our semantics does not
make room for unconceivable states of aairs like one in which Cicero would not be
identical to Cicero.
11
But of course, it can be simply expressed as some kind of knowledge, for example
the common knowledge that Julius = {x (x).
12
To be precise, all non logical expressions below are variables (standing for con-
stants, denite descriptions or formulas). Hence a schema is valid i all its instances
are valid and it is satisable i one of its instance is satisable, and similarly for
logical consequence.
13
There is no claim of technical originality in this paper; but though technically
rather trivial, we think the kind of 1DMS we propose should be regarded as a
coherent alternative, and maybe the more natural one, as soon as 2DMS comes
under scrutiny.
14
This will imply a further semantic choice as to the treatment of empty singular
terms, what this choice will be does not matter here.
15
With the same proviso as before that a and b exist.
16
We do not even consider here attempts like Restall's (Restall 1997) to bypass
these objections in the larger setting of the problem of logical omniscience.
17
This is in contradistinction with more 'brutal' treatments of '=' like the one in
(Restall 1997).
18
Existence and uniqueness of d follow trivially from our denition of f
N
L
.
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